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To Live Outside the Law You Must Be Honest:
Bram Fischer and the Meaning of Integrity*
Stephen Ellmann**
Brain Fischer could "charm the birds out of the trees."' He was
beloved by many, respected by his colleagues at the bar and even
by political enemies.2 He was an expert on gold law and water
rights, represented Sir Ernest Oppenheimer, the most prominent
capitalist in the land, and was appointed a King's Counsel by the
National Party government, which was simultaneously shaping the
system of apartheid.' He was also a Communist, who died under
sentence of life imprisonment.
Responding to his introduction at the From Apartheid to
Democracy in South Africa Symposium, Justice Albie Sachs'
resisted the notion of "heroes," but Brain Fischer was surely
heroic. Yet it is no exaggeration to say that during his life Brain
S"[T]o live outside the law, you must be honest" is from Bob Dylan, Absolutely
Sweet Marie, on BLONDE ON BLONDE (Sony/Columbia Records 1966). Thanks to my
colleague Michael Perlin for the citation.
"* Associate Dean for Faculty Development and Professor of Law, New York Law
School. I thank the participants in the Symposium on Apartheid to Democracy in South
Africa: A Symposium in Honor of Kenneth S. Broun (January 26, 2001) for their
comments on these issues and I also want to thank the University of North Carolina
School of Law faculty and students who organized the Symposium for all their work to
make the Symposium a pleasure to be a part of. In addition, I appreciate the comments of
George Bizos, Geoff Budlender, Tom Karis, Louis Raveson, Nancy Rosenbloom, Stuart
Woolman and the students in Professor Woolman's class at Columbia Law School, with
whom I discussed these issues, as well as the participants in faculty colloquia at Rutgers
Law School (Newark) and at New York Law School, to whom I presented this paper.
Finally, I thank New York Law School for financial support of this work.
' STEPHEN CLINGMAN, BRAM FISCHER: AFRIKANER REVOLUTIONARY 175 (1998)
(quoting South African attorney Charlie Johnson).
2 See id. at 117, 163, 230.
3 See id. at 117, 195, 217, 289.
4 Justice Albie Sachs is a member of the Constitutional Court of South Africa and
a man who, like Brain Fischer, endured a great deal in the struggle against apartheid.
After detention without trial and exile, he lost an arm when South African agents
bombed his car on April 7, 1988. ALBIE SACHS, THE SOFT VENGEANCE OF A FREEDOM
FIGHTER 51 (2d ed. 2000).
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Fischer, this most respected of lawyers, violated many laws,
sometimes openly and sometimes covertly. I want to tell this
aspect of Fischer's story in some detail, not to impugn his
memory, but rather in the hope of understanding the moral
decisions faced by a lawyer of both great integrity and passionate
opposition to apartheid during the long decades of that oppressive
system. I never had the honor of knowing Brain Fischer, but I have
had the great fortune to know some South African lawyers for
fifteen years now, and I have been impressed by their courage and
integrity, which I rather think owe something to Fischer's legacy.
While the choices he made were his choices, and represent only
one of the ways that lawyers honorably responded to the evil of
apartheid, in speaking about Fischer I seek to speak about the
meaning of integrity in a world where integrity and justice are
surrounded and beset by evil. That was the world of South Africa
over much of the last fifty years, but of course not a world whose
boundaries were ever confined to South Africa's.
Let me add one more word before I begin. I could not have
written this essay if I did not have on my desk the extraordinary
and definitive biography of Bram Fischer by Stephen Clingman.5
Clingman's concern is with Fischer's life as a whole, rather than
the particular dilemmas Fischer faced as a lawyer. My concerns
begin with those lawyer's dilemmas, though ultimately I too want
to speak of Fischer's life and heart. In doing so, to a very large
extent I am reading Stephen Clingman and through him, I hope,
Bram Fischer.
I. Anti-Apartheid Lawyering and the Law
While South African lawyers who opposed apartheid knew
that they faced great obstacles in the cases they brought and
defended against the state, they-or at least many of them, black
and white-continued to work within the legal system to obtain
there what victories they could. In many ways, therefore, they
embraced a strategy of playing within the rules. But this decision
by no means reflected any concession that the system was actually
a just one. For many of these lawyers, this choice was
accompanied by other choices, choices that involved at least some
5 CLINGMAN, supra note 1.
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violations of the law. Brain Fischer followed this path especially
far, but many other lawyers walked it as well.
Indeed, for many black South African lawyers, lawbreaking
was almost the first step in their practice of the profession. Under
apartheid laws, black lawyers were prohibited from setting up
offices in the downtown areas where the courts were located
without special government permits. Nelson Mandela, for
example, tells us in his autobiography that, in the early 1950s,
"[t]he authorities refused to renew" the permit that temporarily
had allowed Mandela and his partner, Oliver Tambo, to set up an
office in Johannesburg.' They "insist[ed] that we move our offices
to an African location many miles away and virtually unreachable
for our clients. We interpreted this as an effort by the authorities to
put us out of business, and occupied our premises illegally, with
threats of eviction constantly hanging over our heads."7 In
Kenneth Broun's unique and illuminating book,8 which we rightly
celebrate at this conference, Dullah Omar, later the Minister of
Justice in the first post-apartheid government, remembers starting
an illegal partnership with an African lawyer:
I filled in my application forms. I lied about our relationship,
and I said he was working for me. I lied under oath about a
number of things. I, too, had to apply for a Group Areas permit
because I could not practice in the city without a permit. So we
had to tell a few lies on my permit as well.9
Similarly, Ismail Mahomed, the late Chief Justice of South
Africa's Supreme Court of Appeal, told Broun that he could not
legally have chambers as an advocate in Johannesburg. Camping
in sympathetic colleagues' offices for years,'" Mahomed and the
lawyers whose offices he used may all have violated the law.
Some years later, Dikgang Moseneke, who would one day play an
important part in South Africa's peaceful transition to democracy,
hoped that he and his partners would be charged for setting up
their office despite the law. At the time they thought:
6 NELSON MANDELA, LONG WALK TO FREEDOM 151 (1995).
7 Id. at 132.
8 KENNETH S. BROUN, BLACK LAWYERS, WHITE COURTS: THE SOUL OF SOUTH
AFRICAN LAW (2000).
9 Id. at 224.
10 Id. at 162-64.
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"There will be a hell of a case. It will be all over in the papers:
New Black Law Firm Resists the Group Areas Act. What more
fun can you have than that?" In the end, they didn't charge us.
For some reason they just backed off from charging us. And we
were dying to be charged. '
Another kind of lawbreaking was also far from unknown to
South African lawyers opposed to apartheid. The careers of
Nelson Mandela and Oliver Tambo illustrate this point. These two
men, at one time the partners of the only African law firm in South
Africa,'2 were also leaders of the African National Congress
(ANC). In 1953, Nelson Mandela was the "volunteer-in-chief' for
the Defiance Campaign, in which he and thousands of others
committed a range of acts of civil disobedience. Mandela was
convicted for his actions, but a South African judge held that this
was no ground for Mandela to be disbarred.'3 Later, Mandela went
underground and became "the leader of a nascent guerilla army,"'4
uMkhonto we Sizwe, in effect the military arm of the ANC.' 5
Tambo went into exile and led the ANC from outside South Africa
for almost three decades. Probably everything Mandela and
Tambo did in those capacities was illegal.
Bram Fischer also engaged in lawbreaking of this sort. His
office was one of those that Ismail Mohamed used.'6 During and
shortly after World War II, both Fischer and his wife, Molly, took
part in Communist party "food raids." In these raids, party
members took grocery goods that the merchants were hoarding or
selling at above the prices set by war regulations and sold them at
the lawfully-fixed prices.'7 At best this conduct was of "marginal
legality."'" In 1948, Fischer pled guilty to aiding and abetting an
Id. at 98.
12 MANDELA, supra note 6, at 145.
'3 See id. at 126-40, 162-63; see Incorporated Law Society, Transvaal v. Mandela,
1954 (3) SA 102 (TPD).
14 MANDELA, supra note 6, at 282.
'5 Id. at 270-74. "UMkhonto we Sizwe" means "The Spear of the Nation." Id. at
274.
16 BROUN, supra note 8, at 162-63; CLINGMAN, supra note 1, at 348.
17 CLINGMAN, supra note 1, at 160, 167.
I8 See id. at 167.
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unlawful strike by African miners."9 Within a few years of the
1950 ban of the Communist Party, Fischer became part of its
resuscitation as an underground, illegal organization. ° In response
to these actions, Bram and Molly Fischer faced constant
governmental pressure throughout the 1950s and early 1960s.
Bram Fischer was officially listed as a Communist, both Fischers
received banning orders, and they were subjected to police
searches and wiretapping.2' In 1960, Molly Fischer, though not her
husband, was detained without trial under a State of Emergency.22
It is one thing to violate the obviously unjust laws of racial
segregation that blocked black South Africans from practicing
law, or even to engage in unlawful political activities "at night"
outside the sphere of legal work. It is perhaps another matter to
violate the law in the course of one's legal practice itself, for here
the grounds for finding an obligation to obey the law are
particularly substantial.23 This too, however, was not unheard of in
19 Id. at 182.
20 It is not clear exactly when Fischer and his wife, Molly, became part of the
underground organization. Clingman reports, however, that the Party had re-established
itself by 1953, id. at 193, and specifically mentions that, "[gliven the South African
Communist Party's recent reconstitution, it is hard to believe that Molly's trip [to China
in 1954] did not have any clandestine purposes," id. at 203.
21 Id. at 194, 209-10, 267.
22 Id. at 265.
23 The possibility that lawyers are specially obliged to obey the rules of their own
profession stems from at least three sources: the oath of admission lawyers take, the
daily interactions lawyers have with each other, and the lawyers' continued participation
in the legal system. I will not explore these moral arguments in detail, but it is important
to sketch them briefly.
The oath of admission, whatever its exact language, surely implies to others that the
oath-taker will obey the rules that directly govern the lawyer's professional activity. A
lawyer might maintain that an oath calling, say, for fidelity to the Republic of South
Africa bound him or her only to the laws of the just nation that was waiting to be born,
but unless the lawyer announced this interpretation, it would no doubt come as a surprise
to many other members of the profession. A lawyer might also maintain that a promise
or oath offered to an evil antagonist had no moral force, but this position seems hard to
sustain as a general proposition. Finally, lawyers might contend that their decision to
take the oath of admission was coerced because they could not otherwise challenge the
injustice of apartheid through the courts. This point has force, but not every lawyer who
came to oppose apartheid could really have said that he or she was "coerced" into
becoming a lawyer.
The daily interactions that lawyers have with each other also may generate moral
obligations. If lawyers and judges tend to trust each other, perhaps warily but still
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. [Vol. 26
apartheid South Africa, although for obvious reasons it was
probably little spoken of at the time. Dullah Omar told Kenneth
Broun that he had carried messages between prison inmates whom
he represented. 4 Omar used his access to the individual inmates as
their attorney to pass from one to another what they could not
communicate directly.5 This conduct clearly violated prison rules.
Nelson Mandela confirmed that Robben Island inmates relied on
their lawyers to smuggle letters out of prison-" [I]awyers were
not searched"-and to carry messages to the ANC in exile in
Lusaka.26
Some lawyers who were also determined political opponents
of apartheid might even have been willing to lie for the sake of
their cause. Godfrey Pitje, who was admitted as an attorney in
1959, remembered telling the security police that he was not in
touch with Nelson Mandela, who was then underground. In fact
Pitje "used to meet him [Mandela] in disguise."'2 Perhaps men and
women prepared to take these steps in their private lives were also
prepared to take similar steps as lawyers: to violate the obligations
of legal ethics, and of the criminal law, in their legal practice. As
meaningfully, because of their shared membership in the legal profession and their
presumed adherence to its norms then each lawyer who receives that professional trust
from others while in fact not living by those norms is engaged in a form of deception.
The deception, moreover, is not abstract, but personal-directed at the particular men
and women with whom the lawyer interacts and whose trust he or she seeks to
manipulate.
Finally, lawyers' participation in the legal system may also generate moral claims.
Participation may imply some measure of consent, confirming the apparent meaning of
the oath of admission. In addition, participation may sometimes lead to victories, and
then the lawyer who rejects the obligations of the profession is in the position of seeking
and obtaining benefits while refusing to acknowledge reciprocal duties.
I do not mean to suggest that any of these sources of professional obligation
generate claims that always trump the other ethical duties resulting from the right and
obligation to oppose injustice. Moreover, these grounds of professional obligation may
have less force in some contexts than in others; the norms of the courtroom may have
more claim on lawyers than those of the prison, for example, where shared trust and
decent treatment may be in scant supply. My point is only that even in an unjust society
where, in general, law does not deserve obedience, the obligations of the legal profession
itself will often still have special, moral weight.
24 BROUN, supra note 8, at 228.
25 Id.
26 MANDELA, supra note 6, at 421.
27 BROUN, supra note 8, at 21.
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we shall see, this is the terrain that Brain Fischer arrived at after a
career dedicated to the law.
II. Bram Fischer and the Law
Bram Fischer is perhaps best remembered for one remarkable
act of courage and self-sacrifice, which grew out of his own arrest.
In June 1964, Fischer had finished his work as lead counsel for
Nelson Mandela and the other leaders of uMkhonto we Sizwe at
the Rivonia trial. The Rivonia trial ended with sentences of life
imprisonment, an outcome that was seen as a victory against the
possibility of the death penalty.28 This victory preserved the lives
of Mandela and his co-defendants, and made it possible for them
eventually to return to the stage of South African and world
history. Just three months after the trial, in September 1964,
Fischer himself was arrested and charged with Communist
activities.29 He applied for bail. A co-defendant, who had faced
charges twice before and not fled, was denied bail, while Fischer's
request was granted.3" Bail enabled him not only to leave jail, but
also, as the magistrate granting it understood, to leave the country;
and leave the country he did.'
Two details of this story are important here. First, the legal
profession supported Fischer's application for bail with great
intensity. One lawyer named Rissik, who ultimately put up the
substantial bail himself, testified, as Clingman writes, that "he was
prepared to underwrite Bram's bail for any amount: 'I have
absolute faith in his integrity. I would accept his word
28 CLINGMAN, supra note 1, at 319-22. Walter Sisulu, perhaps Mandela's closest
comrade, said of this verdict as follows:
Our Movement should have been broken, without leaders and without hope. But
instead it was alive, singing, marching in procession right there around the
court, with ANC colours flying. It was not just our celebration, but had become
a world celebration with ANC colours waving. We were expecting death and
now we were all alive preparing for the next phase of the struggle.... Now we
were a central part of a worldwide movement.
WALTER SISULU, I WILL Go SINGING 150-51 (2001) (an interview/biography of Sisulu,
"[i]n conversation with George M. Houser and Herbert Shore") (punctuation modified).
29 CLINGMAN, supra note 1, at 337, 348.
30 Id. at 338-39.
31 Id. at 339-40.
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unhesitatingly, confident that he would carry it out."' 3 2 Second,
Fischer did not leave the country to escape trial, although it is
conceivable that the government hoped he would depart the scene
for exile.33 Rather, Fischer left South Africa to argue an appeal
before the British Privy Council on behalf of a Rhodesian
manufacturing company." Throughout much of his career, Fischer
was on retainer to some of South Africa's largest industries, just as
he was almost always on the Johannesburg Bar Council, the
governing body of advocates. 5 He was at the center of South
Africa's legal elite. Indeed, he had practically been born to the
role-his father became the Judge President of the Orange Free
State division of the Supreme Court, one level below the highest
South African court of his time.36 From his arrival in Johannesburg
to begin his law practice, Fischer "almost in some pre-assigned
way ... became ensconced among the Bar's elite social circle."37
When he applied for his passport, which was suddenly
approved just before his arrest, 8 Fischer "conveyed a message to
the Minister via the chairman of the [Bar] Council that he would
refrain from political activity in England."" He perhaps violated
this promise, since he met with the Communist Party in exile
precisely to discuss whether he should return to South Africa.
Fischer did, however, argue his case before the Privy Council as
planned (and won it), and then returned home to face trial." Up to
this point, Fischer's story is more or less that of a favored son of
the Afrikaner establishment, unaccountably gone astray, but still
ultimately staying within the rules.
That soon ceased to be true. After his trial resumed, Fischer
estreated, or, to use cruder American language, jumped bail.
32 Id. at 339 (quoting Peter Ulrich Rissik).
33 Id. at 340.
34 Id. at 337.
35 See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
36 CLINGMAN, supra note 1, at 334.
37 Id. at 108.
38 Id. at 337-38.
31 Id. at 370. He later maintained that this statement affected the grant of his
passport, but not his getting bail. Id.
40 Id. at 342-46.
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Rissik was repaid the bail money he had put forward,4' but Fischer
had still unmistakably violated his implicit, and arguably express,
undertaking to the court that he would stand trial. 2 Harold Hanson,
Fischer's lawyer, read out to the court a letter that he said was
delivered to him that day. 3 In the letter Fischer told Hanson, "I
wish you to inform the Court that my absence, though deliberate,
is not intended in any way to be disrespectful." Instead, he
explained his reasons for believing his action was morally
required, and concluded by saying: "I can no longer serve justice
in the way I have attempted to do during the past thirty years. I can
do it only in the way I have now chosen."45 Despite the certainty
that his actions would subject him to harsher criminal charges and
longer punishment if he was caught, he saw this step as "a
supreme duty."46 It was a matter of special anguish to him that, two
days after he fled his trial, the Johannesburg bar, of which he had
been so prominent a member, filed proceedings to strike him from
the roll of advocates, or in other words to disbar him. 7 Fischer was
disbarred, by the same judge who had presided over the Rivonia
trial, and his name has never been restored to the roll."
No other public step Fischer ever took divided him so totally
from the world to which he had been born. 9 Fischer's 294 days
underground were very difficult. The political work he had hoped
4 Id. at 358.
42 At his bail hearing, Fischer testified: "I have no intention of avoiding a political
prosecution. I fully believe I can establish my innocence. I am an Afrikaner. My home is
South Africa. I will not leave South Africa because my political beliefs conflict with
those of the Government ruling the country." Id. at 338. Even if this declaration falls
short of a promise to stand trial to the end, as distinguished from a promise only to return
to South Africa (as Clingman suggests, id. at 370), it is obvious that a criminal defendant
seeking bail implicitly represents that he will continue to attend his trial.
43 Id. at 355. Hanson was not telling the truth. He had gone to Fischer's house the
previous day to pick up the letter, and Clingman writes that "[iun fact when Bram told
Hanson what he planned to do, Hanson had said he would do anything to help him." Id.
at 364. Hanson's acts surely put him too in breach of ordinary legal ethics.
44 Id. at 355.
45 Id. at 356.
46 Id.
41 Id. at 368-72, 389-91.
48 Id. at 389-90, 454.
49 See id. at 390.
50 Id. at 401.
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to do came to little, although the symbolic consequences may have
been important, in particular to the Rivonia prisoners on Robben
Island." The pain of hiding and being cut off from most of those
whom he knew was acute. 2 After ingeniously transforming his
physical appearance, he indiscreetly resumed contact with people
he felt he could not be apart from.53 Within the tremendous
constraints of secrecy, Fischer was "surrounded by women,"54 but
he was without his wife, because she had died just after the
Rivonia trial, in a freak automobile accident that took place while
Fischer was driving.5 His daughters felt that he would never have
gone underground had she been alive, 6 and now he was losing
even more. After he was captured, having failed to act decisively
to flee the country when he might have,57 Fischer paid the price he
had expected: he was now tried on more extensive charges than he
had confronted at his original trial, including sabotage. 8 In the
end, the price was even worse than he had anticipated, because he
had hoped and even believed that apartheid would end soon.
Fischer was sentenced to life imprisonment. Nine years later
he died after succumbing to cancer, which may have been
aggravated by gross malpractice by his prison doctor. After he
died in his brother's house, legally still a prisoner, his ashes were
claimed by the Department of Prisons. 6' Among the many
hardships he endured, perhaps the worst was the death of his son
Paul, who had suffered from cystic fibrosis from birth.6 Arthur
Chaskalson, now the President of South Africa's Constitutional
Court, gave the eulogy for Paul because his father was locked
behind prison walls.62
5' Id. at 375-76.
52 Id. at 379.
53 Id. at 365-68, 379.
54 Id. at 379.
55 Id. at 323-28.
56 Id. at 357.
57 Id. at 382, 388, 392, 398-99.
58 Id. at 406.
59 Id. at 392, 418, 427.
60 Id, at 432-41.
61 Id. at 217-18, 427-28.
62 Id. at 428.
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It is less widely known how far Bram Fischer had departed
from the normal rules of lawyering before he shocked his
colleagues at the Johannesburg bar by fleeing his trial. To
understand how far he had already gone, we need to return to the
Rivonia trial, in which Fischer led the defense of Nelson Mandela
and other leaders of uMkhonto we Sizwe. It was natural that he
should be the lead counsel for the accused in this case, for he was
a senior counsel who had helped win the great ANC Treason Trial
only a few years before.63 But Fischer was reluctant to take the
case. The young lawyers who joined him on the case did not
initially understand why and Fischer evidently did not tell them. It
was only in the course of their case preparation that they examined
documents collected by the prosecution and found Bram Fischer's
handwriting on them. ' Fischer's handwriting was there because,
although he "was never a member of uMkhonto we Sizwe, . . . he
was deeply involved at Rivonia, attending meetings, discussing
policy, drafting documents."65
He was, in other words, probably already a co-conspirator in
the case he was defending. Certainly he was an accessory after the
fact, for after the Rivonia arrests he was personally involved in
getting rid of a car that one of the accused had been using.66 He
also helped another lawyer involved in uMkhonto's work to flee
the country after the lawyer, "quite possibly" with Fischer's prior
approval, had bribed a guard in order to successfully escape from
jail.67 He avoided being in court and left some early witnesses for
his co-counsel, purportedly on the ground that he had to handle
another case; actually, these witnesses could have identified him
as a visitor to the uMkhonto headquarters in Rivonia. Even so, he
wound up cross-examining another witness who, as Clingman
writes, at any moment could have answered "But you know about
this, Bram, because you were at the meeting."" On one occasion in
63 Id. at 301. For more information on Fischer's role in the Treason Trial of the
1950s, see id. at 228-64.
64 id. at 304-05.
65 Id. at 287.
66 Id. at 293. The car needed to be disposed of to prevent its being discovered at a
cottage being used as a "safe haven." Id.
67 Id. at 295.
68 Id. at 304, 312.
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court, the prosecutor offered into evidence a document with
handwriting on it, and the writing was identified as belonging to
the brother-in-law of one of the accused. Fischer looked at it,
didn't blink, and passed it to his co-counsel. No doubt they did
their best not to blink too-but the handwriting belonged to
Fischer.69
Obviously, these acts took Fischer some distance from
conventional legal ethics. He did no injustice to his clients; they
knew where matters stood and admired his bravery in taking the
case.7° But when a lawyer, in the course of .defending his clients,
faces evidence that actually implicates him, he has what in normal
circumstances would be seen as a conflict of interest. When a
lawyer cannot tell his co-counsel that he is himself at peril in the
case they are working on, we would ordinarily say that he has also,
in some sense, breached faith with them and perhaps endangered
the effectiveness of their work.
Fischer's clearest departure from the world of ordinary legal
obligation, however, took another form. Here is Stephen
Clingman' s description:
UMkhonto we Sizwe had been all but destroyed at Rivonia,
and it was necessary to reconstitute it, even if in minimal form:
this occurred while the Rivonia Trial proceeded. A new National
High Command was established: Wilton Mkwayi was seconded
from the ANC, and Dave Kitson from the Communist Party;
they were joined by a comrade called Chiba. Following precepts
all the more stringent now, each of them had to cease active
membership within his home organisation, but at the same time
there had to be links. Accordingly, Brain Fischer became Dave
Kitson's liaison with the Communist Party, and they kept up
regular contact. . . . Bram brought Kitson money in large
amounts, smuggled in from overseas, and fairly soon, Kitson
recalled, they had reactivated the uMkhonto structures, with
some 600 members in the Transvaal alone, as well as acquiring
cars, vans and other equipment.
Brain also brought along exhibits from the trial, now a
repository that was proving surprisingly useful. For handed in
among all the documents were maps of likely targets for
69 Id. at 305.
70 Id. at 304.
[Vol. 26
BRAM FISCHER AND THE MEANING OF INTEGRITY
sabotage, as well as plans for blowing them up-and Bram gave
them to Kitson to pore over. Perhaps, given the machinations of
the prosecution, Bram took the dry view that documents, once
submitted as exhibits, were in the public domain; or he may
have been able, to this extent, to separate his various
commitments and responsibilities in competing areas of his life.
Still, there was a certain flagrancy, if not an outright
contradiction of his normal fealty to the ethics of the court.
Bram was not so naive after all: with the trial on in full force,
and under the fierce onslaught of the state, there was no need to
retain an absolute purity; legal imperatives had been
subordinated to the political .... As long as the trial proceeded
there was a moratorium on all sabotage activity (it was crucial to
avoid any provocation that might reinforce the possibility of
death sentences), and other organisations observed the
moratorium as well. But as soon as it ended the new leadership
clearly had it in mind to re-initiate their campaign. Even some of
the accused, remarked Kitson, relayed suggestions via Bram of
what to blow up and how.7
This is a remarkable passage. Brain Fischer, while defending
the Rivonia accused against charges of sabotage, was in fact
conspiring to commit more sabotage. He conspired with the
defendants in his case to continue committing the crimes for which
they were on trial. He took advantage of his access to the accused
in jail to relay information that would further this conspiracy. And
he used documents to which he had easy access, due to his
position in the case, to promote these same crimes.72 It must be
said, in light of these acts, that when Fischer 1lter told the Court
that he had absented himself from his trial because he could no
longer serve justice in the way he had for the past thirty years, 73 he
I' Id. at 310-11. This and all other excerpts from STEPHEN CLINGMAN, BRAM
FISCHER: AFRIKANER REVOLUTIONARY (copyright 1998 by Stephen Clingman) are
reprinted by permission of the publisher, the University of Massachusetts Press.
72 Id. Clingman mentions that another lawyer and Communist "had given evidence
(under instruction from Bram) when subpoenaed in the Rivonia Trial." Id. at 366. It is
not clear from this brief reference whether Fischer influenced this lawyer's testimony in
ways that would have been unlawful. When Fischer himself was tried, however, he
smuggled messages to a jailed former Communist Party colleague, Piet Beyleveld, who
was preparing to testify against him. Fischer wrote to "Beyleveld that the threat of ten
years [imprisonment] meant nothing, and that he must not give evidence under any
circumstances." Id. at 349.
73 See id. at 356.
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was not being altogether candid. He had already stopped trying to
serve justice within the bounds of the law, and was already trying
to serve justice in quite another way, by becoming what might be
called a guerrilla or a spy within the legal system.
III. Integrity and Law Breaking
We might ask, in response to all this, whether Brain Fischer's
conduct was justified. For those who are convinced that violent
action, even violent action directed only against property," is
never a just response to oppression, his actions were wrong. For
those who accept the legitimacy of violence as a tool to end
intolerable abuse when other means have failed-and anyone who
considers the American revolution or the Union's military struggle
in the Civil War justified is such a person-it is evident that
violence was a justifiable response to the stunning oppression of
apartheid South Africa. Whether violence was the wisest course of
action can still be debated, but, even if it was not the best strategy,
it was surely a justifiable choice.
Once it is accepted that lives could ethically be taken in the
struggle against apartheid, it might seem difficult to muster an
argument that the rules of legal ethics could not be violated.
Breaching the rules of legal ethics may be a form of lying and a
violation of the promise of obedience entailed in the oath of
admission.75 Lies and breaches of promise, however, are not such
grave acts as killing. The greater includes the lesser, and if killing
was justified, so was Fischer's departure from legal ethics.
But this is too neat. Killing may not always be worse than
breaking faith. The soldier who kills an enemy soldier in the heat
of battle may have less to answer for than the spy who takes
advantage of human trust to steal military secrets. A lawyer trusted
implicitly by his professional colleagues breaks faith with many
people in a way that the rifleman does not. Spies are rarely held in
high esteem, because they live a life of falsehood, and we are in
some ways more troubled by that than by frank, lethal contest.
74 In "the first stage of armed struggle, uMkhonto took care to avoid any loss of
life." CLINGMAN, supra note 1, at 280. Even in 1963, at the time of the Rivonia arrests,
uMkhonto apparently had not yet embraced "guerrilla warfare." Id. at 300, 312-13.
75 See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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There might be two other costs of making this choice. First,
following Fischer's path risked sacrificing whatever gains could
be won in the South African courts. I have argued elsewhere that
these gains, from outright courtroom victories to valuable
opportunities to address a watching world, were real. 6 Obviously
any lawyer who went as far as Fischer was abandoning his legal
career and thus his chance to contribute to the anti-apartheid
movement as a lawyer. But even if lawyers followed Fischer only
part of the way-by breaking the rules of ethics when they saw
that as necessary, but always trying to escape detection-they
risked not only personal disaster, but also the gradual deterioration
of the perception of anti-apartheid lawyers as fellow members of
the legal fraternity. That perception may have protected and
encouraged anti-apartheid legal advocacy by lending it the mantle
of the traditions of the bar, and forfeiting this mantle might have
had profound costs. In the end, however, while anti-apartheid
lawyers may in fact have come under some suspicion," my sense
is that they did not forfeit the credibility and leverage they had as
legal professionals. Whether this was because they scrupulously
and consistently adhered to the rules of the game, or because their
departures from the rules did not become widely known,
ultimately this first concern is not an acute one.
The second cost raises a longer-range issue. When wars end,
armies are demobilized or even merged, as in South Africa today.
Courts may be another matter. If they have been used as mere
tools by all those concerned-with judges being told how to rule
by the government, prosecutors working in league with brutal
security police, and defense counsel and defendants lying and
cheating whenever they could get away with it-then which
institutions will provide justice after the struggle is over? Kenneth
76 STEPHEN ELLMANN, IN A TIME OF TROUBLE: LAW AND LIBERTY IN SOUTH
AFRICA'S STATE OF EMERGENCY 248-74 (1992).
77 In 1987, the Appellate Division (then South Africa's highest court) upheld a
state of emergency regulation barring emergency detainees from access to their lawyers
(except with government permission). The court rejected an argument that the possibility
of adopting case-by-case measures to avoid the "security risks arising from contact
between a detainee and his legal adviser" made the regulations' broad-brush approach so
unreasonable as to be beyond the state's authority. Omar and Others v. Minister of Law
and Order and Others; Fani and Others v. Minister of Law and Order and Others; State
President and Others v. Bill, 1987 (3) SA 859, 857 (A); see ELLMANN, supra note 76, at
94-97.
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Broun suggests, as have others (including me), that the remarkable
struggle by black and white lawyers to extract justice from the
courts of apartheid South Africa taught those involved in the
struggle the value of the rule of law and helped make South Africa
a country governed by law today."8 But if Brain Fischer, the
paragon of anti-apartheid lawyers, was actually engaged in
breaking the law, in court, with his clients, what could any of them
have learned, or later taught, about the rule of law?
Even if lawbreaking by anti-apartheid lawyers did undercut the
hold of the rule of law on South African life, it might have been
justified. Certainly the possible acts of these lawyers were far less
egregious assaults on the rule of law than the ferocious violations
of legal order committed by apartheid's supporters. 9 What harm
these lawyers may have done, moreover, might well be
outweighed by the contributions they made to the ultimate victory
over apartheid, perhaps precisely by virtue of law-breaking in the
service of the struggle. But the moral calculations that these
suggestions point to may not have to be undertaken; we must first
try to measure whether some harm was actually done to the rule of
law.
I will not immediately answer these questions of the moral
significance of breaking faith, and its long-term impact on the rule
of law. Instead, I want to pose another question: How did Bram
Fischer come to do these things? I don't mean by this to ask
another question, which one might utter in tones of outrage: "How
could Bram Fischer have done these things?" The ferocity of
apartheid explains, as an intellectual matter, how a lawyer could
come to believe that obedience to the law was impossible. Nelson
Mandela and others reached similar conclusions. What I want to
ask, rather, is how Bram Fischer in particular came to take the
steps he did. When we understand better who Bram Fischer was,
we will be in a better position to return to the larger moral
questions that I have left unresolved for now.
78 BROUN, supra note 8, at 255-56; ELLMANN, supra note 76, at 266-67. Dikgang
Moseneke makes a similar point in BROUN, supra note 8, at 108-09.
79 South Africa has struggled to identify and respond to the stunning violence of
apartheid (and sometimes of its opponents) through the work of the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission. For a wrenching and moving account of this Commission's
efforts, see ANTJRE KROG, COUNTRY OF MY SKULL: GUILT, SORROW, AND THE LIMITS OF
FORGIVENESS IN THE NEW SOUTH AFRICA (1999).
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Let me start this way. Bram Fischer was "to the manor born."
He was a member of the Afrikaner elite and the grandson of
Abraham Fischer, an Afrikaner leader during the years of
resistance to the British and afterwards." He was the son of Percy
Fischer, who would become the Judge President of the Orange
Free State division of the South African Supreme Court.8 He was
an outstanding athlete, a Rhodes Scholar, and someone who might
easily have lived a life of privilege and power.82 Fischer had an
ease that reflected the confidence such an upbringing could
produce. "3 Yet he seems also to have had the anxiety that such an
upbringing could produce too, the nagging doubt that he was
really all that he wanted to seem."4 Moreover, Brain Fischer came
from a very unusual elite-an elite that had known bitter defeat in
the Boer War and in an abortive Afrikaner rebellion during World
War I, an elite with a tradition of resistance." He was a person
who could see grandeur in what the world might call ignominy.
Fischer was also an utterly charming man. In the words of
Ismail Mahomed, Bram Fischer "was gifted with a personality
which conquered all who had the privilege to know him," reflected
in "a dignity and a courtesy which was unfailing, an integrity
which was unbending, a warmth and a gentility which was rich
and infectious . . . ." He respected others, was slow to condemn
anyone,87 and built connections all around. The Fischer home was
80 See CLINGMAN, supra note 1, at 6-28.
81 Id. at 334.
82 Id. at 40, 67-68 (detailing Fischer's athleticism); 101 (noting his success as a
Rhodes Scholar); 48-49, 78-79, 105, 109 (chronicling his early promise).
83 Id. at 39, 58, 97, 109.
84 Id. at 38, 40-41, 107-09, 224, 291.
85 Id. at 29-31.
86 Ismail Mahomed, The Bram Fischer Memorial Lecture, 14 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS.
209, 209- 10 (1998).
87 CLINGMAN, supra note 1, at 353.
88 Id. at 98-99, 165, 247, 292, 429. In a letter to her husband, Molly Fischer told
him, "Someone else said that from the time you took over [to argue for the accused in the
Treason Trial], kindliness descended over the whole court!" Id. at 262. After being
sentenced to life imprisonment, "[e]ven across the borderlines of prison enmity Bram
managed to make the kinds of connections that defined him." Id. at 425. Similarly, Hugh
Lewin, a fellow prisoner (and opponent of apartheid), describes Fischer's suffering at the
hands of one abusive jailer, but says that, even with this man, Fischer was "irrevocably
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filled with guests; their parties were key events in the social life of
the left. The swimming pool at their home, perhaps built first to
help combat the young Paul Fischer's cystic fibrosis, became an
oasis of interracial harmony in the midst of apartheid.89 When his
underground Communist colleagues were urgently consumed with
issues of tactics and maneuver, Fischer's focus seemed rather to be
on which comrades had which personal problems or needs.9" Even
a state witness, testifying at Fischer's trial, agreed that Fischer had
a "saint-like quality."9' Arthur Chaskalson wrote recently that
Fischer displayed respect for human dignity "in every aspect of his
life."9
2
In modern terms, Fischer believed in a web of connection, a
morality of people rather than of rules.93 If this morality of
connection is more characteristic of women than of men,94 it seems
fair to add that Fischer combined characteristics that might
stereotypically be called masculine and feminine. A quite small
man, he was a very good rugby player, yet surely one of the few
rugby players of his day to seriously contemplate missing a match
to attend a garden show.95 He could also use his capacity to charm
others to his advantage. In cross-examination, he won admissions
from witnesses not by browbeating them, but by winning them
polite and courteous." HUGH LEWIN, BANDIET: SEVEN YEARS IN A SOUTH AFRICAN
PRISON 213 (1974).
89 Id. at 171, 220-21, 224, 252.
90 Id. at 282-83; see id. at 452 (quoting Joe Slovo-lawyer, Communist, leader of
uMkhonto, and later, Minister of Housing in the first post-apartheid government). As
Slovo recalled:
[Fischer] wasn't a communist in the sense that we used to understand the way a
communist operated. And in that sense he laid the basis for the future .... In
his personal relationships with people he had a sort of humanistic approach to
the way people should operate in a political party.
Id.
9' Id. at 351.
92 Arthur Chaskalson, The Third Bram Fischer Lecture: Human Dignity as a
Foundational Value of Our Constitutional Order, 16 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 193, 195
(2000).
93 See generally CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL
THEORY AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT (1982).
94 For references to the debate on this question, see Stephen Ellmann, The Ethic of
Care as an Ethic for Lawyers, 81 GEO. L.J. 2665, 2665-66 n.3 (1993).
95 CLINGMAN, supra note 1, at 40, 47.
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over so fully that they told him things because they wanted to
please him.9"
Fischer was, moreover, a person of overwhelming integrity.
This didn't mean he was "[in]capable of concealment," " at least
not by the time he took the steps I have already described. His
cross-examination techniques suggest a capacity to be strategically
charming and self-effacing. So does a story Clingman repeatedly
alludes to, about a tennis match Fischer played as a young man, in
which he lost the first set badly because he devoted it to feeling
out his opponent's weaknesses, and then came back to take the
match. As Clingman puts it, Fischer could be "disarmingly
congenial.""
Fischer's integrity, as his biographer sees it, lay instead in a
determination to achieve consistency in his principles and to
realize his principles in his own life.99 In a crucial turning point as
a young man of Afrikaner nationalist sentiments and Afrikaner
racial prejudices, Fischer found himself called upon to shake
hands with a black man. Clingman writes that "Bram found
himself suddenly overcome by an instinctive feeling of revulsion
which he had to force himself to suppress."'' ° More than thirty
years after the fact, Fischer related his feelings about the incident
to the court that was sentencing him. Remembering that he had
grown up with black children as playmates on his farm, he saw
"that it was I who had changed, and not the black man .... I had
developed . . . an antagonism for which I could find no rational
basis whatsoever."'"' He set himself to change, and what he set
himself to do he was relentless about. 02 Perhaps he was all the
more relentless because he always carried within himself the sense
that he was not the person he ought to be.
He was immensely loyal as well.' 3 Bram Fischer considered
family profoundly important, and his comrades in the Communist
96 Id. at 116, 247-49.
97 Id. at 248.
91 Id. at 249; see id. at 46-47, 423.
99 Id. at 50.
,00 Id. at 51.
101 Id.
102 See id.
103 Id. at 224.
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Party became a larger family.'" He remained a faithful Communist
even after Khruschev revealed some of the truth about Stalin.
0 5
His biographer writes that once Fischer committed himself to the
woman he later married, he never wavered. 16 He wrote to her that
he would be "as honest as it's possible for a human being to be."' °
And yet, oddly, in calling Fischer "unwavering" toward Molly,
Clingman seems to overlook some of the story he himself tells.
Long after Fischer and his wife had professed love for each other,
each of them wavered; Fischer himself may even have become
engaged to another woman.' 8 Later he said that he had "nearly
ruined all the future" in the process.' Still later, from prison,
Fischer wrote to his daughter Ruth "that many marriages
underwent such things" as infidelities, and included as examples
his own marriage and that of his parents."'
Whatever Fischer might have actually had in mind as he wrote
this letter to a daughter in anguish, it is not startling that even as
strong a marriage as Brain and Molly Fischer's could have had
human weaknesses. But Brain Fischer judged his own weaknesses
rigorously. Did he not, perhaps, worry that his loyalty to his
104 Id. at 226. Moreover, he shared his political convictions, and to some extent the
peril to which his politics had brought him, with his family members. Molly Fischer was
a longtime member of the party and was detained without trial during the 1960 state of
emergency. Id. at 265-75. Their daughter Ilse was also a Communist, and apparently
(Clingman does not quite specify the chronology) her father "brought her on to the
central committee", while he was a fugitive. Id. at 397. Ilse also drove the car, as her
father hid on the floor, when he fled from their family home to begin his months
underground. Id. at 362-65. Other members of the Fischer family, without necessarily
sharing all of Brain Fischer's beliefs, assisted him in hiding information or delivering
clandestine messages. See id. at 326-27, 329, 357. To share peril with one's family may
seem startling, but, as Clingman observes, Fischer was always pragmatic. Id. at 357. It
seems right to say that his loyalty to his family was one that encompassed them in his
world, rather than trying to shield them from it. In somewhat the same way, Brain and
Molly Fischer regarded their ill son Paul's "sense of independence as having as absolute
a value as his health," and "they had long decided that part of Paul's normality had to be
the moral and political engagement of his parents." Id. at 272.
105 Id. at 211-13. Even in prison "Brain would brook little criticism of the Soviet
Union." Id. at 424.
106 Id. at 60.
07 Id. at 94.
108 Id. at 103, 112.
109 Id. at 103.
110 id. at 431.
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comrades in the anti-apartheid struggle would be equally
incomplete? Or that he might not live up to the saint-like image
others had of him? "Fuck my career," he said as he contemplated
returning to South Africa to face trial and going underground,"'
but this comment sounds more desperate than saintly. A similar
hint of uncertainty and anguish emerges in Fischer's explanation
of his decision to go underground, in the first letter to his daughter
Ilse from hiding: "I suppose it was worth doing-at any rate, I. felt
I just had to, and that was that.""' 2
Bram Fischer was also a believer, not in God, but in theories. ' 3
He was much taken with a theory of physical and mental
conditioning that his physician brothers viewed as preposterous;
they took his engagement with it as a sign of his naivet6."' He was
no less taken with scientific explanations of history, which he
began mentioning as much as twenty years before he finally joined
the Communist Party."5 When he visited the Soviet Union in the
1930s, he saw railway stations filled with peasants and thought
this was proof of the lazy peasant mentality that Communism was
combating. In fact, the peasants were fleeing the famine to which
Stalin had subjected them."6 As World War II approached, Fischer
was able to maintain that the victims of Stalin's show trials were
actually guilty."7  Various observers, Nelson Mandela and
Fischer's own daughter Ruth among them, felt that Fischer the
person was greater than his Communist ideology, but he himself
adhered to the party line.' 8 He may not have been terribly good at
tolerating uncertainty; his strength was relentless systematizing. In
the face of intensifying repression by the National Party in the
1950s and 1960s, Fischer's need to hold onto his ideological and
" Id. at 341. In any event, he knew that the government planned to ban
Communists from practicing law, so "he had little prospect of anything, by way of a
legal career, to protect." Id. at 342.
112 Id. at 382.
13 Id. at 27.
4 Id. at 228-29.
115 Id. at 59, 92.
116 Id. at 81.
17 Id. at 150.
I's Id. at 190, 291.
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human commitments may have intensified."9 In prison debates
(like Nelson Mandela, Fischer became an eminent figure among
his fellow political prisoners) he took the position, perhaps
surprising for a lawyer, "that conceptual terms could have only
one meaning.""'2 As Clingman notes, "that, after all, was how he
had lived his whole life."
'
'
2
'
Finally, he had seen a lot of history. He was the child of a
family that sought to bridge the great divide of white South Africa,
the gap between Afrikaner and English.'2 2 He was in Europe in the
years when fascism was building towards war.'23 Then he returned
to South Africa and was present during the step-by-step escalation
of oppression by his fellow Afrikaners in the National Party, a
resurgence with overtones of fascism.'24  Democratic and
nonviolent means of resistance had been tried for years, but the
state's oppression was worse, not better.'25 The legislation
outlawing the Communist Party had been enacted in 1950, '26 and
after the Sharpeville massacre of black demonstrators in 1960, the
state banned the ANC and other anti-apartheid groups.'27 Many of
his comrades, including Nelson Mandela and Walter Sisulu, were
"19 See id. at 212.
120 Id. at 423. On Fischer's leadership role in prison, see infra note 137.
121 CLINGMAN, supra note 1, at 423.
22 Fischer's father and grandfather both were part of Afrikaner struggles against the
British. See supra notes 80-85 and accompanying text. But Fischer's grandfather,
Abraham, married a woman whose native language was English, named Brain's father
Percy, and advised Percy to stay in college in Cambridge, England during the Boer War.
CLINGMAN, supra note 1, at 9, 15. Percy in turn married a woman who spoke no
Afrikaans. Id. at 33. In their home, the children spoke English with their mother and
Afrikaans with their father. Id.
M Id. at 87-93.
124 Id. at 92; see also DAVID HARRISON, THE WHITE TRIBE OF AFRICA 117-30 (1985)
(examining the pro-German and pro-Nazi sympathies of many Afrikaner nationalists
during World War II). Clingman emphasizes Fischer's dismay that an Afrikaner "had
caved in" quickly and become a witness against him at his trial; "[s]urely," Clingman
writes, "it was now up to at least one Afrikaner to prove his good faith." Fischer did that
by going underground. CLINGMAN, supra note 1, at 353.
125 CLINGMAN, supra note 1, at 253-54, 264, 278-79.
126 Id. at 185.
127 Id. at 185-88, 253; see also JOHN DUGARD, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE SOUTH
AFRICAN LEGAL ORDER 163-64 (1978).
(Vol. 26
BRAM FISCHER AND THE MEANING OF INTEGRITY
in prison.'21 Mandela, Sisulu and no doubt others had endured the
risks and deprivations involved in leading a life underground.' 29 If
Africans were to suffer this way, how could Fischer hold himself
back? Especially if, in some part of himself, he feared that he
might not have the courage and commitment he owed to his moral
family? As Clingman writes, after Fischer was captured, George
Bizos, a close colleague and himself a dedicated anti-apartheid
lawyer, asked Fischer if it had been
worth sacrificing his family, his profession and everything else?
Brain's response was again angry and clear-cut. He wanted to
know if George had asked Nelson Mandela that question: didn't
Nelson have a practice and a family? George confessed that he
had not asked Mandela. "Well then, don't ask me," Brain
replied.'30
So this is how Brain Fischer came to violate his obligations as
a lawyer. To become a just person, he committed himself to the
political struggle against apartheid, to the ideological tenets of
Communism, and to the personal bonds he shared with his
comrades. He took these commitments very, very seriously.
Throughout his years of political action, Fischer never permitted
himself to shirk duties that others were performing, from selling
subscriptions to the Communist Party paper to meeting with his
underground colleagues while maintaining an above-ground
existence as a lawyer.'3 ' He hardened in the struggle.'32
For many years, Fischer led two lives simultaneously-a life
of professional achievement, elite status, and powerful corporate
clients, meshed imperfectly but tenably with a life of radical
political struggle. At home he and Molly took a black child into
their household; yet they also had black servants, including the
aunt of the little girl whom they had taken into their home almost
2 See MANDELA, supra note 6, at 372-378.
129 Id. at 265-318; SISULU, supra note 28, at 81, 235.
130 CLINGMAN, supra note 1, at 401.
3' Id. at 166-67, 283.
132 When he returned to Europe for a Communist-linked "Congress of the Peoples
for Peace," he disdained London's West End plays as "bourgeois and neurotic," and "it
was evident that his political and aesthetic tastes had hardened from twenty years
before." Id. at 198-99.
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as a member of their family."' Clingman writes that the grace with
which Fischer could join his different lives was part of the promise
he represented to those who knew him.'34 His communism was a
communism of unification.'35 In prison later, Fischer insisted on
maintaining contact even with a fellow prisoner who was clearly
"dangerous, lashing out at his co-prisoners, alternately betraying
them and trying to win their confidence."'3 6 Fischer felt that "they
"'137could not be responsible for driving a man into madness ....
But the country hardened alongside Fischer and the space
within which it was possible to lead two such different lives
contracted. Fischer could not withhold himself from the
underground Communist Party; he could not withhold himself
from its participation in the decision to form uMkhonto we Sizwe;
he could not protect himself from exposure by staying out of the
Rivonia case; he could not abstain from the resurrection of
uMkhonto during. that trial; and in the end, perhaps impelled
further by the terrible loss of his wife, he could not hold back from
following Nelson Mandela's example and going underground. He
broke the law out of despair, out of determination, out of self-
doubt, out of care and love, out of loyalty, and out of integrity. As
he wrote to his lawyer in response to the Johannesburg bar's court
action to strike him from the roll of advocates,
When an advocate does what I have done .... it requires an act
of will to overcome his deeply rooted respect of legality, and he
takes the step only when he feels that, whatever the
consequences to himself, his political conscience no longer
133 Clingman comments that "[t]here is no doubt that [taking in the little girl, Nora
Mlambo,] was in many respects a remarkable gesture for those times, especially for an
Afrikaner," but notes that this act was later seen by some as "Brain Fischer's unholy
communist 'experiment."' Id. at 171. Clingman suggests, however, that the Fischers
acted at least as much out of their "clear sense of human reciprocity" as out of any
political principle. Id. at 171-72.
134 Id. at 226.
'35 See id. at 59-60, 286-87, 375, 413, 456.
136 Id. at 424.
137 Id. One fellow political prisoner viewed him as rigid and Stalinist, but this man
may have been almost alone in his harsh reaction. "[B]y common consent [Fischer] was
the presiding and guiding figure in prison. Everyone came to him with their needs and
their troubles, and no decision of any import was ever taken without hearing his views."
Id. at 424-25. For instances of Fischer's role in prison, see also LEWIN, supra note 88, at
184, 187, 215-16.
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permits him to do otherwise. He does it not because of a desire
to be immoral, but because to act otherwise would, for him, be
immoral. '38
In this light it is possible to answer the troubling questions I
raised earlier about the morality of Fischer's actions.'39 Was
Fischer's breach of obligation worse than killing? In light of
Fischer's life, this question no longer seems so difficult. Though
he violated many of his obligations under the law, he did so out of
obligation rather than out of indifference to it. In countless ways,
he honored the bonds between people, and the obligations of
humanity; his rigorous understanding of those ties led him to his
fate.
To answer the second question posed earlier, whether his
conduct undermined the meaning of the rule of law for others and
for future generations, requires more than a moral response to
Fischer himself. We know that South Africa embraced the rule of
law, and in particular the value of enforceable constitutional law,
in making its remarkable transition to democracy. We do not yet
know, however, exactly how firmly the rule of law has become
ingrained in the new South Africa. In a real sense, the lessons of
Bram Fischer's life are still being learned and still being applied;
their ultimate impact will be the result of what today's and
tomorrow's South African lawyers and citizens say and do.
It would be tempting to say that Fischer's decision to sacrifice
his own well-being and go underground ultimately taught respect
for moral principle and for just law, because it was, after all, a
public moral witness quite akin to civil disobedience. But this
decision, as we have seen, was not the only one Fischer made.
138 Id. at 369-70. This statement is not unlike a comment by Gandhi, who wrote that
a Satyagrahi, a person challenging injustice through nonviolent "truth force,"
obeys the laws of society intelligently and of his own free will, because he
considers it to be his sacred duty to do so. It is only when a person has thus
obeyed the laws of society scrupulously that he is in a position to judge as to
which particular rules are good and just and which unjust and iniquitous. Only
then does the right accrue to him of the civil disobedience of certain laws in
well-defined circumstances.
MOHANDAS K. GANDHI, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY; OR THE STORY OF MY EXPERIMENTS WITH
TRUTH 575-76 (Mahadev Desai trans., Beacon Press 1993) (1957), quoted in John
Leubsdorf, Gandhi's Legal Ethics, 51 RUTGERS L. REv. 923, 939 (1999).
139 See supra notes 75-79 and accompanying text.
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Some people, though not many, knew he had gone further: some
of his political comrades, who might have taken his choices as
guidance for their own later decisions, and presumably some of his
adversaries within the South African security state, who might
have seen in his conduct a confirmation of the immorality of their
opponents. Moreover, if others, anti-apartheid lawyers or South
African citizens, had known of his active contributions to sabotage
during the Rivonia trial, some of them might have deeply
disapproved of his lawbreaking. On the other hand, many South
African citizens--quite possibly most, since most South Africans
were black people oppressed by apartheid and its laws-might
have been impressed and moved by his bravery.
Moreover, while I have been at pains to identify those respects,
until recently not widely known, in which Fischer for the sake of
conscience breached his obligations as a lawyer, what the public
did know about Fischer was remarkable enough. Even in 1965 all
of South Africa knew that Fischer had set himself wholly against
the state. He himself told the court at his trial for sabotage that he
"had become aware of the existence of uMkhonto after it was
formed, 'and I did not disapprove."" 4 All of this was enough, no
doubt, to raise in others' minds, in particular in the minds of anti-
apartheid lawyers, the question of whether they too could no
longer adhere to the rules of behavior of a legal system so
compromised by injustice."'
We simply do not know, and probably never will know, how
many South African anti-apartheid lawyers, ostensibly working
within the limits of the law, chose to violate the rules of legal
practice in the course of the struggle. We can say, however, that if
Fischer's logic had been applied relentlessly and
undiscriminatingly-and not limited to the tremendously
wrenching circumstances in which he himself had to act-the
result would have been legal lawbreaking on a wide scale. This
140 CLINGMAN, supra note 1, at 414. He denied various other connections to
uMkhonto, including "any knowledge of its financial sources," id., although Clingman
reports that Fischer "brought Kitson [a member of uMkhonto] money in large amounts,
smuggled in from overseas." Id. at 311.
'4' David Dyzenhaus, in his thoughtful and admiring discussion of Fischer,
emphasizes the challenge he posed to his colleagues. DAVID DYZENHAUS, JUDGING THE
JUDGES, JUDGING OURSELVES: TRUTH, RECONCILIATION AND THE APARTHEID LEGAL
ORDER 99 (1998).
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lawbreaking would have gone far beyond the limited contexts,
discussed earlier in this article, in which it is now public
knowledge that lawyers broke the law.'42 By the 1980s, South
Africa's legal system presented a host of occasions for anti-
apartheid lawyering, from work akin to American poverty legal
services to labor law to the defense of anti-apartheid activists both
prominent and obscure. In all of these settings it might have been
convenient to break the normal bounds of legal ethics for the sake
of clients or (not necessarily the same thing) for the sake of the
cause.
If Fischer's choices were widely, though covertly, imitated, we
would not easily be able to say whether the result was to
undermine the rule of law for the future, or only to undermine the
rule of apartheid then and there. The ravaging injustice of
apartheid pervaded South African law, yet even so its courts
ordinarily remained open and sometimes did justice in the face of
apartheid's logic. In the words of Walter Sisulu, a determined
revolutionary and no stranger to South Africa's courts, "there is a
certain amount of justice in the judiciary." '43 It could be that
disrespect for the rules of even so gravely flawed a legal system
would teach disregard forever."' Like other human behavior,
lawbreaking is, no doubt, partly a matter of habit, and a habit once
acquired as a part of ardent political struggle might find expression
in other, less admirable moments as well. On this ground, I feel
that the possibility that a part of the heritage of South Africa's
anti-apartheid lawyering might have been a norm of widespread
lawbreaking is a troubling one. On the other hand, men and
women go to war and come home to peace. South African
lawyers, similarly, might have disregarded the rules of ethics in a
142 See supra notes 6-27 and accompanying text.
141 SISULU, supra note 28, at 118.
1'4 As David Dyzenhaus observes, "right can never be entirely on the side of one
who decides to overthrow an order which still contains vestiges of the rule of law."
DYZENHAUS, supra note 141, at 134. John Leubsdorf comments about Gandhi as follows:
[He] never treated the existing system as a mere power structure that lacked any
legitimacy, so that revolutionaries should manipulate or disregard it at will. He
would have regarded such an attitude as fatal to the moral growth of both the
manipulators and the manipulated, and he believed that growth was essential to
any real or lasting improvement.
Leubsdorf, supra note 138, at 937.
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racist authoritarian state, and come home to honor those same
rules as part of a democratic order. And perhaps each of these
patterns may have held true for some South African lawyers.
My own perception, however, is that many anti-apartheid
lawyers, even in the midst of apartheid's rule, remained deeply
convinced of the moral significance and value of law. For these
lawyers, Fischer's life surely did not teach the lesson that law
could be casually dispensed with in order someday to restore law.
I suspect that, just as his gentle, self-effacing style of lawyering
may have helped shape a generation of South African anti-
apartheid lawyers' courtroom tactics,' 5 so his decisions to violate
the law out of principle contributed to many principled lawyers'
determination, not to disregard the obligations of legal ethics, but
to fight relentlessly and courageously to overturn the world of
apartheid. Whether or not lawyers like this ever felt themselves
obliged to depart from the law-not widely and habitually but
only, as Fischer did himself, in circumstances of surpassing moral
crisis" 6-the lesson they brought to the new South Africa would
not have been disrespect for legal order. Rather, they would have
sought, and did seek, a Bill of Rights, as Albie Sachs writes in his
remarkable memoir, to eliminate the horrors that "compelled the
most honest amongst us to become the biggest dissemblers."'4 7
145 On Fischer's style, see CLINGMAN, supra note 1, at 116, 247, 255, 299-300. For
an instance of "unusual emotion," see id. at 308. On Fischer's impact on other lawyers,
see id. at 454-55. For an account of the comparable style of advocacy that seems to have
been characteristic at least of many anti-apartheid South African lawyers, see ELLMANN,
supra note 76, at 238-41.
146 Lawyers who chose not to violate the law might nevertheless have also chosen to
stretch it. A lawyer who would not knowingly lie in court, for example, might have
structured his or her inquiries of the client so as not to come to know intolerably
damaging facts. I have argued that such conduct can be justified, in limited
circumstances, even in the United States, a society whose legal system is obviously far
less flawed than that of apartheid South Africa. See Stephen Ellmann, Truth and
Consequences, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 895, 905-09 (2000). Conduct of this sort does stay
within the bounds of the law, albeit uncomfortably within them. As such, it may be less
disrespectful and less threatening to the values of the rule of law than blunt (and covert)
disobedience.
147 SACHS, supra note 4, at 208. The Johannesburg bar has come to recognize that
"a grave injustice' was done to Fischer" when his name was taken off the roll of
advocates. DYZENHAUS, supra note 141, at 99 (quoting the General Council of the Bar's
submission to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission hearings on the legal
profession). His name has not been restored to the roll. Clingman writes that the reason
is that "[o]nly practising advocates may appear on the roll; someone who is no longer
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We do, therefore, have reason to think that Fischer's actions
ultimately affirmed, rather than undercut, the role of law in a
future South Africa. But we do not, and in fact cannot, know this
with certainty. Our efforts to calculate the ripples of someone's
actions over a span of thirty years and more must always be
somewhat speculative. Fischer himself, as he decided what to do,
could not have known exactly what the results of his choices
would be.'48 In the end we must judge the rightness of actions in
part by understanding the person who took them, and all the more
so because the impacts that actions have are in part the product of
the moral quality of the person who acted. Choices recklessly and
callously made resonate differently over the years than those made
alive can no longer practise; therefore Bram could not be reinstated." CLINGMAN, supra
note 1, at 454. Surely this is a requirement that could be made waivable, and should now
be waived.
Candor compels the acknowledgment that Fischer had by 1965, overtly and
covertly, gone far beyond the bounds of normal legal ethics. (His actions as a lawyer in
the Rivonia trial were not then known, however, and the sole basis for his disbarment
appears to have been his breach of his bail.) See supra notes 63-72 and accompanying
text. A lawyer who systematically acts on the principle that the rules of legal ethics are
not binding can hardly continue to act as a lawyer. Even so, it was not necessary to
remove Fischer from the roll, for he was already on a trajectory that would send him to
prison or at the very least keep him far from the work of legal advocacy. Moreover, the
government had already announced its intention to bar all communists, in or out of
prison, from practicing. See CLINGMAN, supra note 1, at 342, 369. (Nelson Mandela,
imprisoned for life, was never struck from the roll of attorneys. See MANDELA, supra
note 6, at 426-27.) Nor, ultimately, was it just to strike Fischer from the rolls. Fischer,
the moralist who turned to illegality in an immoral society, did not deserve to be cast out
as dishonorable. As his lawyer Sydney Kentridge urged in court at the time, "It was
doubtful.., if there were any member of the Bar that had known Brain who would be
prepared to stand up and say, 'He is a less honourable man than I am."' CLINGMAN,
supra note 1, at 389.
Ironically, South Africa, with its history of internal division, also had a history of
distinguishing to some extent between crimes committed out of political conviction and
crimes that made a lawyer unfit to practice law. See Incorporated Law Society, Transvaal
v. Mandela, 1954 (3) SA 102, 107-09 (TPD); Ex parte Krause, 1905 TS 221. Fischer
himself invoked this distinction in his response to the Johannesburg bar's proceeding
against him. See Soc'y of Advocates of S. Afr. (Witwatersrand Div.) v. Fischer, 1966 (1)
SA 133, 135H (OPD). The precedents may not have encompassed all that we now know
Fischer had done; indeed, in one further irony, Fischer's own father was apparently the
lawyer in an unsuccessful attempt to forestall the disbarment of an Afrikaner rebel
convicted of high treason. Incorporated Law Society v. De Villiers, 1915 OPD 98. It is
still sad that Fischer was not treated with the generosity South Africa sometimes
accorded its erstwhile adversaries.
148 DYZENHAUS, supra note 141, at 134.
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with a full heart. Fischer acted with a tremendously full heart.
Others might have chosen differently, and I do not say that
Fischer's choices were necessarily the best ones. I do say that they
were the morally justified choices of a remarkable man.
IV. Conclusion
Bram Fischer offered himself as a sacrifice, as Clingman
emphasizes.' 9 In a life that initially might seem quite removed
from Fischer's, and more frivolous than his, Oscar Wilde similarly
became a sacrifice. Wilde sacrificed himself for a life of artistic
and sexual freedom. Bram Fischer may once have flirted with this
version of human liberty,'50 but seems largely to have cast it aside
in favor of political earnestness. Yet the two men shared lives
filled with early promise, graced by personal kindness, and drawn
almost ineluctably towards terrible loss.
The routes they took towards their final suffering were not,
after all, entirely different. Fischer's choices were more political
than Wilde's, but both were certainly fueled by deep emotion.
Wilde's decision to file a baseless libel suit against his lover's
father, a suit he could only pursue through perjury and that
ultimately his perjury was insufficient to sustain, sent him to
prison at the height of his success, and cut him away from the
society that had briefly acclaimed him. It might be said that he did
all this to satisfy his vengeful lover, yet these decisions also grew
out of the fundamental impulse toward self-expression that Wilde
exemplifies even today.
Wilde's life teaches lessons of personal liberation and its costs,
and his actions do not reflect the burdens of power and
responsibility that lawyers often undertake. The sense that Wilde
stood for principle even as he violated the law, however, resonates
149 See CLINGMAN, supra note 1, at 456.
150 Fischer wrote to his future wife from Europe in 1932 to express, or confess, his
thoughts about sexuality: "For me the only thing that is wrong is that which impedes the
development of intellectual life on this planet." Id. at 93. As Clingman writes, Fischer
"told Molly 'he had not actually put his sexual philosophy into practice'-just why is
difficult to say." Id. Molly disagreed in principle, but also pointed out in her letter back
that "You have such 'frightfully loose moral standards' and then you never do a thing to
be ashamed of ..... Id. at 94. Her insight reflected not only Fischer's own rectitude, but
also his tendency to work for others' well-being while almost never being able to ask for
help for himself. Id. at 425, 428-29. Both aspects of his personality helped bring him to
the radical, even desperate, steps of his last years of freedom.
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with the life that Fischer led, and each became an avatar of a
liberation he would not live to see. Moreover, Wilde, who was a
socialist as well as an artist, may in his own way have had a moral
rigor quite comparable to Fischer's. As my father, Richard
Ellmann, wrote in the biography of Wilde he completed just
before his death:
Essentially Wilde was conducting, in the most civilized way,
an anatomy of his society, and a radical reconsideration of its
ethics. He knew all the secrets and could expose all the pretense.
Along with Blake and Nietzche, he was proposing that good and
evil are not what they seem, that moral tabs cannot cope with the
complexity of behavior. His greatness as a writer is partly the
result of the enlargement of sympathy which he demanded for
society's victims. '5
Wilde himself wrote, in words that describe both him and Bram
Fischer, that:
Personality is a very mysterious thing. A man cannot always be
estimated by what he does. He may keep the law and yet be
worthless. He may break the law, and yet be fine. He may be
bad, without ever doing anything bad. He may commit a sin
against society, and yet realize through that sin his own
perfection.5 2
In writing about Bram Fischer I have tried to offer an
appreciation of Fischer akin to my father's appreciation of Oscar
Wilde. It is not necessary to agree with Brain Fischer's choices to
understand that they were moral choices. It is also not necessary to
ignore the role that personal loss or anguished self-examination
played in his choices to recognize that they were principled
decisions-the kind that human, emotional beings make. Perhaps,
though, it is necessary to understand how impressive a man Brain
Fischer was in order to accept, even somewhat comfortably, the
reality that if one lawyer can break the law out of principle, so can
others. We cannot stop this, and we cannot doubt that some of the
lawyers who do this will do so mistakenly or that others will claim
the mantle of principle when in fact they are merely corrupt. We
can only say that we should seek to educate our students, and to
151 RICHARD ELLMANN, OSCAR WILDE xiv (1987).
52 Oscar Wilde, The Soul of Man Under Socialism, in OSCAR WILDE, THE ARTIST
AS CRITIC: CRITICAL WRITINGS OF OSCAR WILDE 255, 265 (Richard Ellmann ed., 1969).
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strengthen ourselves, to live, as Bram Fischer did, with integrity,
because it is certainly true that to live justly outside the law, you
must be honest.
